

# From Plantation Sugar to a Bittersweet Democracy: Black Democratic Attitudes in the English-Speaking Caribbean

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In this piece, I examine the relationship between race and democratic attitudes in the English-Speaking Caribbean. I make the case that due to the historical and continued experiences of Black Caribbeans with systematic oppression, relative deprivation, and unequal distribution of resources, Black satisfaction with democracy and democratic support will lag behind other Caribbean racial groups. Using cross-national survey data from 10 Anglophone Caribbean states, I show that Black Caribbeans tend to be less satisfied with democracy, especially when compared to Caribbeans of South Asian descent, but support democracy at levels commensurate with all other racial groups. These satisfaction effects are strongest in Guyana and Trinidad & Tobago, where large populations of Indo-Caribbeans and Black Caribbeans foster adversarial and racialized political dynamics. The discussions and findings in this piece develop an understanding not only of an understudied region in the English-speaking Caribbean but demonstrate the importance of race in evaluating democratic attitudes.

**Keywords:** Democratic Attitudes, Race, Anglophone Caribbean, Black Politics, Democracy

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In November 2021, Barbados formally removed the Queen of England as the Barbadian head of state, switching to a Republic with the former Governor General transitioning to a role as the new president (Landler and Ahmed 2020). This change came after renewed protests in the global Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement, with other Caribbean countries, most notably Jamaica, also rethinking the place of the British Crown in the Caribbean and making efforts to address the long history of racism and colonialism.<sup>1</sup> Along with changes in the head of state, Black people in Anglophone Caribbean<sup>2</sup> societies have made attempts to advocate for reparations for plantation slavery and the removal of racist monuments such as those commemorating Horatio Nelson and Christopher Columbus (The Haitian Times 2020; Contributor 2023).

These changes demonstrate a set of Caribbean societies with active citizens intent on democratic self-government and perceptive of colonizers' historic wrongs. With regard to democratic regimes and the mass public's attitudes, democratic survival relies on the support of the public (Dahl 1956; Lipset 1959). If public opinion towards democracy shifts in a negative direction, institutions of democracy may consequently suffer retrenchment towards more authoritarian styles of governance. Indeed, this has been shown empirically by Claassen (2020), who finds that, over time, positive shifts in public support of democracy can positively impact democratic performance in states (Claassen 2020).

However, the performance of the dominant mode of liberal democracy exists as a paradox for Black folks around the world, as Black people in many former colonial states have been placed in an intractable position as both the upholders of progressive, emancipatory democracy, while still experiencing routine oppression and inequality at the hands of past and present imperial powers (Du Bois 2017; Rodney 2019). Emblematic of this, Guyanese

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<sup>1</sup>Other Caribbean countries have previously made this change closer to their independence, namely Guyana, Trinidad & Tobago, and Dominica, in order of their removal of the Crown as the head of state (Phillips 2021).

<sup>2</sup>I will use both Anglophone Caribbean and English-speaking Caribbean to refer to the formerly British colonized possessions in the Caribbean. This includes island states such as Jamaica, Barbados, the Bahamas, the smaller states in the Leeward Islands, as well as Belize and Guyana.

activist-historian Walter Rodney notes that while “colonialism is the opposite of freedom and democracy”, Black people have been consistently conscripted to “fight for justice” and the “white men’s cause” in the World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam, and instead calls for a Black people to fight for their own interests (Rodney 2019).

Building on this, Black scholars have long criticized Black people’s position in democracy while also recognizing the emancipatory potential of genuine democracy for underserved Black folks. In the first chapter of the classic work on Black people in the United States, “The Souls of Black Folks”, W.E.B. Du Bois comments on the shifts after the American Civil War where “a million black men started with renewed zeal to vote themselves into the kingdom” (Du Bois and Marable, 2015, Ch. 1, p. 17). From this perspective, democracy and enfranchisement can function as a clear liberating force for Black people in exploitative societies to reach higher echelons of emancipation. Despite this ambitious language, Du Bois recognizes the need for further progress in democracy and the limitations of democracy as currently envisioned for Black people (Du Bois 2017). In an analysis of Du Bois’s *Black Reconstruction*, Sumpter (2001) notes that while Du Bois recognized mainstays such as free elections and the franchise as critical to democracy, Du Bois also suggests the “tolerance of certain deficiencies” in the democracy of the day, such as shortcomings in the education system, the unequal extension of constitutional protections, and, of course, generalized racial discrimination inhibit the full realization of democracy (Sumpter, 2001, p.). Succinctly stated in a 2023 opinion piece in the San Francisco Chronicle, Jefferson (2023) asks “Can democracy persist in a society so stratified by race and ethnic differences” (Jefferson 2023)?

In this piece, similar to the issues raised by scholars of Black politics in the United States and the observations of Walter Rodney, I offer a portrait of Black Caribbean societies that exhibit exceptional democratic accomplishments, but serious flaws built into their systems, predicated around White supremacy, colonialism, and related issues of unequal distribution across race and class lines. Furthermore, I argue that Black Caribbeans observe these inequities, understand their situation, and consequently hold attitudes toward democracy that

may challenge democracy, or at least the prevailing paradigm of liberal democracy.

To evaluate these questions, I empirically examine the democratic attitudes of Black Caribbeans as compared to the other main racial groups in the region, namely Indo-Caribbeans, mixed, white, and Indigenous Caribbeans. Using survey data sourced from the Americas-Barometer in 10 English-Speaking Caribbean countries and with a series of multilevel models, I show that Black Caribbeans tend to be less satisfied with democracy than both Indo-Caribbeans and white Caribbeans, yet levels of support for democracy tend to be similar across racial groups. Further, in order to consider the role of class and material conditions, I demonstrate that the differences in attitudes may be moderated by income and the provision of public goods, with income and public goods especially important for Black Caribbeans. I also break apart the findings for Guyana and Trinidad & Tobago, the states with the largest Indo-Caribbean populations, and show that the largest gaps in democratic attitudes exist in these societies. I conclude with a synthesis of results, as well as recommended avenues for studies of democratic attitudes in the English-Speaking Caribbean, as well as for the study of race and democratic attitudes.

## **A Profile of Democracy in the Anglophone Caribbean**

After World War II many countries in the Caribbean achieved independence from their colonizers, with Britain being the predominant colonial power still present in the region. In the English-speaking Caribbean, Jamaica became the first colony to gain independence from Britain in 1962. Other countries soon followed, with regional leaders Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Barbados becoming independent in the mid-1960s (1962 for Trinidad & Tobago, 1966 for Guyana and Barbados). The English-speaking Caribbean thus reflects the most recent set of independent countries in the Western hemisphere. Indeed, the most recent independent state of St. Kitts and Nevis only achieved independence in 1983.

Despite the recent post-independence nature of these small Caribbean states, relative

regime resilience and democratic stability have been far more predominant than other post-independence states in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, as well as from the trends in the Latin American region. For instance, in 2022 regional leaders Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago were both listed as Flawed Democracies by the Economist Intelligence Unit, rather than hybrid or authoritarian regimes.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, from other evaluators such as Freedom House, some countries in the Caribbean perform among the best in the world. Freedom House rates Barbados as “Free” and as one of the most robust democracies in the Western Hemisphere, scoring a 38/40 on political rights and 57/60 on civil rights (total of 95/100). Similarly, they rate the Bahamas 38/40 on civil rights and 53/60 on civil liberties (total of 93/100). These scores far outstrip those of the United States, which in the 2022 Freedom House ratings scored a combined total of 83/100, and compares favorably to the 2022 United Kingdom combined score of 93/100 ([Freedom House 2023](#)). Other countries, such as the previously mentioned Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago, rate within this range of the US, scoring 80 and 82, respectively. Overall then, these Caribbean states stand as relatively robust democracies that align in many dimensions to some of the stronger democracies around the world, and even those in the Global North.

Due in large part to their small size, soon after independence the Caribbean states quickly formed into economic unions and more formalized cultural groupings. Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago, and Barbados became the founding members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), which quickly expanded as other states gained independence in the 1970s and 1980s. With regard to sport, for international cricket competitions, countries in the English-speaking Caribbean competed under the overarching aegis of the ‘West Indies’, fostering a shared regional pride as they performed well from the 1970s-1990s. Furthermore, justice structures are shared for the region, with a common regional supreme court. In addition, the flagship higher education system in the region, the University of the West Indies, developed over the years with main campuses in Jamaica, Trinidad, and Barbados, educating generations

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<sup>3</sup>[See 2022 Economist Intelligence Unit Chart](#)

of Caribbeans.

Despite their strong democratic performance, many countries in the English-speaking Caribbean perform worse as compared to others in the Western hemisphere in terms of democratic support (Williams, 2022, Ch.1). When comparing democratic attitudes among the greater Americas region, Williams (2022) demonstrates that countries such as Jamaica and Guyana perform near the bottom across a number of survey years in both democratic satisfaction and democratic support. Furthermore, consistent with general hemispheric trends, negative evaluations of democracy tend to be more frequent in recent years. For instance, Jamaica in 2019 scored well below the region mean and is the second lowest country survey in terms of democratic support, exhibiting a higher score only than Mexico in 2016. Even states with the strongest democratic practices, such as the Bahamas and Barbados, demonstrate mixed attitude profiles, with higher than average democratic satisfaction, and lower than average democratic support.

In all then, Caribbeans have made exceptional strides in governance but the states are clearly stunted in the growth towards full democratic consolidation, both at the institutional level and with regard to citizens' attitudes. Despite the extensive Black population, and majority non-white populations, how can these states still not work for the Black populations and how does this impact people's views of their democracy? To answer this question, I contend that the racial and class-based character of exclusion in the region negatively influences Black democratic attitudes. As noted by Thame (2021), the regional leader of Jamaica is a "Black space", yet despite this numerical advantage, "anti-blackness still remains seared within the social and political life of the nation-state" (Thame 2021).

# Discrimination and Colonial Legacies: Limiting Democratic Progress in the Caribbean

To begin, I define race here not as “a genetic attribute...but rather a socialized perception of biological phenotypical characteristics” (Alleyne 2002). Given this understanding, race has played a significant part in the structuring of Caribbean societies both before and after independence in the Caribbean (Smith 1984; Kelly 2023). Historically, the British Caribbean served as a formative location in the development of the modern construction of race. Barbados implemented the first English colonial slave codes in 1661, which Jamaica adapted, and South Carolina, Virginia, and Georgia then adopted (Rugemer 2013). These put into place institutions that would heavily restrict movement, marriage, and trade for enslaved people (Lightfoot 2015; Rugemer 2013). Furthermore, these codes also formalized the ability for white enslavers to form ‘slave patrols’, predecessors of modern enforcement structures in these areas, to execute colonial law and restrict the movement of enslaved Africans.

With regard to race and class, Guyanese historian Walter Rodney highlights the persisting forces of racism and discrimination in the post-independence Caribbean, noting that “since ‘Independence’, the Black police force of Jamaica have demonstrated that they can be as savage in their approach to black brothers as the white police of New York, for ultimately they serve the same masters” (Rodney, 2019, p. 25). Here, despite the majority Black population in Jamaica, Rodney criticizes the institutions and structures of Jamaica as still serving a larger racist and imperial structure. Furthermore, the use of *‘Independence’* in quotation marks by Rodney emphasizes the role of neocolonial forces in determining the fates of Jamaica and other Caribbean states even after their nominal independence.

Indeed, with regard to prolonged dependence, to this day many of these states rely heavily on economic involvement from the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada, often in the form of tourism, to sustain their own economies. For context, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in 2016 direct and indirect revenues from tourism

accounted for 39% of the Barbadian and up to 57% of the Antiguan Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ([Chapter 3. Caribbean Tourism in the Global Marketplace: Trends, Drivers, and Challenges](#)). Especially in the smallest countries, criticism of the tourist industry in the region by Black activists has highlighted negative effects such as “foreign ownership of prime land”, “de facto segregation” and “visible economic and racial disparities” ([Quinn, 2014](#), Ch. 1, p. 35). With regard to land ownership, some have noticed a transfer of power that occurred in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century from white plantation owners to foreign white investors, continuing cycles of race-based land dispossession for Black people in the Caribbean. In addition, the tourist industry has been called an entity that furthers the plantation economy and mindset, at times with new (or even the same) white owners of capital ([Quinn 2014](#)).

A further point illuminated by Rodney is the specific presence of police and state violence, especially toward Black and/or poor Jamaicans. Again, Rodney condemns police forces as frontline agents of a larger White Supremacist structure, unfavorably comparing Jamaican police to the infamous New York City police forces of the 1960s. Importantly, Rodney notes that Black Jamaicans often serve as members of these forces, meaning that despite the Black majority, racist restrictions and barriers can still persist and even flourish. This is important for discussions of democratic survival and health in the region, as systematic racial and colorist discrimination creates severe inequities in societies, even when upheld by Black agents of the state.

Beyond Rodney’s analyses, other scholars, activists, journalists, and citizens have critiqued the security and police apparatus in the English-Speaking Caribbean continuing to the present day. For instance, once again consider the illustrative case of Jamaica, a key-stone state in the region. Throughout Jamaican history, extensive policing changes and expansions have directly responded to significant Black strikes, rebellions, and liberation movements ([Thomas 2022](#)). Most notably, shortly after the Morant Bay Rebellion in 1865, a Black-led protest advocating for justice and poverty alleviation, Jamaican authorities established the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), the first consistent policing body on the



island ([Thomas 2022](#)). In 2010, again in Jamaica, the Tivoli Incursion saw Jamaican state security forces clashing with the Shower Posse (a local drug cartel), eventually leading to the deaths of over 70 civilians ([Thomas 2022](#)). Regarding the last few years, while a 2019 Amnesty International report on Jamaica notes some improvements in the performance of the police force and judicial system, killings by the police remain a serious concern ([Amnesty International 2023](#)).

Building upon the legacies of racial discrimination, beyond the base forces of racial identification, scholars have described colorism, defined here as “a form of discrimination based on a person’s skin tone”, as a continued issue for people in the Caribbean ([Lemi and Brown, 2020](#), p. 669). Even within Black populations in the Caribbean, society favors lighter skin in politics, business, and general interactions, leading to harmful practices such as skin whitening. Indeed, in a study of youth in Jamaica, [Charles \(2009\)](#) demonstrates that a large percentage of young people bleach their skin in order to “look beautiful”, “attract a partner”, or because that they perceive themselves as “too dark” in general ([Charles, 2009](#), p. 164). [Charles \(2009\)](#) also highlights that preference for lighter skin, and thus skin bleaching, derives from “routinized interaction of societal institutions like the government, the church, the education system, the media, formal culture, and popular culture.” Rather than fostering an equitable democratic society, a number of institutions, including the government, education system, and other institutions that remain critical for satisfactory democratic functioning, instead reinforce the preferences of white, colonial society. This reinforces that even in these predominately Black societies there still remain limits on achievement and daily life for Black Caribbeans, and especially those that present as phenotypically darker.

More generally, political institutions in the Anglophone Caribbean reflect those of the United Kingdom, and the Westminster model remains predominant ([Corbett and Veenendaal 2016](#)). As such, there is a strong two-party system in the Caribbean, with often only minor ideological differences between parties. Despite the routine presumption of strong inherited democratic institutions, the system of democracy has been noted as “particular-

istic and polarized” (Veenendaal 2013), especially in exceptionally small states such as St. Kitts and Nevis. Indeed, when describing the broader political situation in the Anglophone Caribbean, Veenendaal and Corbett (2020) describes the early proto-democratic institutions in a negative light:

“In the Caribbean colonies these institutions were primarily employed to exploit and oppress the nonwhite population, while only a very small group of affluent white merchants and plantation owners (the ‘plantocracy’) exerted political influence. It could therefore be argued that Caribbean populations have primarily experienced Western institutions in an authoritarian, exclusionary, and oppressive way, since Caribbean colonies were essentially ruled by authoritarian regimes until the extension of the franchise in the 1940s. The combination of Western political institutions and authoritarian rule is at the root of post-colonial political development in the region, which is marked by a unique blend of formally democratic institutions and a profoundly authoritarian informal political culture” (Veenendaal and Corbett, 2020, p. 64).

While on the surface level implementing otherwise successful democratic institutions, Veenendaal and Corbett (2020) illustrate how the predominant institutions in the Caribbean exploited and oppressed, rather than liberated the Black population, leading to a political climate that exhibits clear democratic deficiencies. Indeed, criticism of the Westminster model and its related institutions have led to challenges across the Caribbean, most notably in the early 1980s in Grenada, where a Black leftist revolution took control, and which the United States eventually quashed with a clear show of hemispheric supremacy.

Recent large-scale quantitative analysis also reinforces the place race and colorism play in structuring society in the Anglophone Caribbean. For instance, Kelly (2020) shows with public opinion data from AmericasBarometer that darker-skinned Jamaicans are less likely to have access to necessary household amenities and complete fewer years of schooling than those with lighter skin. In a 2023 study, Kelly examines Jamaica and also extends an analysis to Trinidad & Tobago and again shows that educational attainment and household amenities lag behind for Black and darker-skinned Caribbeans. Despite small numbers of white Caribbeans, Kelly (2023) points to a clear “pigmentocracy that privileges lightness”

structuring Caribbean society, conferring status and power to white, mixed, and generally light-skinned Caribbeans. To speak to the effects of these forces of discrimination on the labor market, as recently as the 2001 Jamaican census, Chinese and white Jamaicans held a massive set of available manager, professional, and top official positions, as compared to their racial group's relative population. Astonishingly, white Jamaicans held 16% of these positions (3.2% of 2001 total population), and the small Chinese Jamaican population filled 40% of the top positions (1.2% of 2001 total population) ([Kelly 2023](#)).

## Expectations

Overall, the Anglophone Caribbean states are relatively strong and stable but still have major fault lines, often built around race, that can hinder full democratic consolidation. Historical and contemporary mistreatment, lack of opportunities, and the levels of discrimination in the societies and continued lack of societal support for the Black population lead to my first main expectation:

**Hypothesis 1** Black people in the Anglophone Caribbean will have lower levels of satisfaction with democracy and support for democracy as compared to people in other racial groups, especially white people.

My base expectation for the structuring of race in the Anglophone Caribbean into the understanding and application of intrinsic vs. instrumental support for democracy ([Bratton and Mattes 2001](#)). As discussed by [Bratton and Mattes \(2001\)](#), intrinsic support is “based on an appreciation of the political freedoms and equal rights that democracy embodies when valued as an end in itself”, while instrumental indicates “regime change is a means to other ends, most commonly the alleviation of poverty and the improvement of living standards”. In this understanding, the latter perspective on instrumental support has been applied especially in contexts in the Global South where issues of poverty and standard of living remain paramount.

While it is not to say that in these countries in the Global South, people cannot intrinsically support democracy, the importance of political and economic goods can be especially salient in these societies. In fact, with regard to generalized democratic support in the Global South, democratic “profiles” have been shown to exist in Latin America, where citizens support certain areas associated with democracy and not others, for instance, support for limiting executive power but ambivalence on an area such as inclusive participation (Carlin and Singer 2011). In other places such as Southeast Asia, scholars have shown that the instrumentalized view of support relies on priorities like good governance, as well as both the “freedom from fear and freedom from want”, where want indicates the ability to afford “basic necessities” (Pietsch, 2015, p. 43). Notably, this illustrates that instrumentalism can expand beyond the base economic characteristics to more generalized governance.

In the African context, both government performance and economic delivery of goods appear to be a critical part of democratic support (Chasukwa 2019). In the previously referenced study by Bratton and Mattes examining South Africa, Ghana, and Zambia, findings show that approval of government performance is the factor with the strongest magnitude of association with both democratic satisfaction, with economic delivery also correlating especially with democratic satisfaction, but less so with democratic support. Beyond this, other work argues more forcefully for the inclusion of economic delivery as a necessary feature for the establishing of consolidated democracy, with Blaauw (2007) holding that “for democracy to be truly consolidated in the country, however, these intrinsic elements must be complemented by an instrumental component. Simply put, political freedoms must be supported by economic delivery” (Blaauw, 2007, p. 189).

Returning to the Caribbean context, a lack of good governance and economic delivery have been consistent issues for Black people, and especially Black people of lower classes. Furthermore, the class component of the colorist democracies of the English-speaking Caribbean has been criticized heavily by Caribbean thinkers. In a book review of the biography of the first Barbadian Prime Minister, Errol Barrow, by Hilbourne A. Watson, Ledgister (2021)

notes the continuation of class inequalities in the form of democracy after independence:

Bourgeois democracy in the former British West Indies is, for Watson, a political order that is rooted in the late colonial past and continues the racial and class structures of the colonial era, albeit with greater social mobility for the black working class and political control by the black middle class. (Ledgister, 2021; Watson, 2020, p. 513).

From the above quote from Ledgister (2021), we can see Watson (2020) criticizing the character of democracy in the Caribbean, indicating that the democracy is clearly demarcated by class with power distributed most to those of the upper classes, and some limited improvements since independence. The text goes on to comment on “White economic dominance, part of a global structure of white supremacy” that has been maintained with only modest social democratic reforms, such as “free education at all levels”, that do not challenge the economic system or the “Western hierarchy of race” (Ledgister, 2021; Watson, 2020, p. 513).

In the Anglophone Caribbean, Thame notes how certain “Black lives seem to matter more than others” and Black Jamaicans living in ‘garrison communities’ seem to matter less as well in terms of security and treated antagonistically by the state (Thame 2021). Furthermore, while there is a movement towards democracy Thame notes that negative stereotypes of Jamaicans again refer to Black Jamaicans and that in most cases it is “dark-skinned people who carry the weight of stigmatization”, and especially poor Black Jamaicans (Thame, 2021, p. 222).

Because of the material necessity of the Black population and continued deprivation, it is these populations that are most disenfranchised by the not fully consolidated democratic system. For these people living in Caribbean societies, “consequences are most felt by Blacks at the bottom who live in ghettos and find themselves in conflicts and confrontations with each other, and with the State over police killings, lack of water, roads or opportunities” (Thame 2021). Given this I put forward the following two conditional hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 2a** For Black people in the Anglophone Caribbean, the negative relationship with democratic attitudes will be stronger for those with less income.

**Hypothesis 2b** For Black people in the Anglophone Caribbean, the negative relationship with democratic attitudes will be stronger for those not satisfied with their public services.

The lack of resources for the underserved Black communities and democracy has been echoed in criticisms by political entities in the Caribbean. For instance, the Working People's Alliance (WPA), a democratic socialist party in Guyana, worked specifically to deal with class-based issues both in Guyana and in connection with broader Caribbean movements. In specific reference to questions of income and service delivery, in 1992, approximately 30 years after independence, the WPA asked in a rhetorical press release, "did the material lifestyle of the Guyanese improve?" because of independence (Thomas, 1992, p. 401). For these Black power and workers' based movements, "the immediate enemy of Black Power would not have been non-Blacks, but the Blacks who had been helped to capture the state in the early 1960s. Being Black did not necessarily qualify one to work to dislodge a system that surely demobilized the population" (Thomas, 1992, p. 401). Overall, I therefore expect income, class standing, and resource allocation to serve as a crucial moderating force in the role of race in structuring democratic attitudes in the Caribbean.

## Approach

In order to examine the relationship between race and democratic support in the English-speaking Caribbean, I rely on public opinion data from the AmericasBarometer collected by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) (LAPOP 2019). Although data from LAPOP has been frequently used to examine attitudes in Latin America & the Caribbean more broadly, as noted by scholars of race and attitudes in the region, see (Kelly and Bailey 2018; Kelly 2020, 2023), few studies have focused on the Caribbean exclusively. Furthermore, to the author's knowledge, none have examined the complex racial dynamics of democratic attitudes in the English-speaking Caribbean.

I include in this analysis English-speaking states in the Caribbean basin that gained their independence in the mid to late 20<sup>th</sup> century, thus excluding states such as Haiti, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic. Thus the states in this analysis, with years of the survey in parentheses, are the Bahamas (2014), Barbados (2014), Dominica (2016), Grenada (2016), Guyana (2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2021), Jamaica (2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2019), Saint Lucia (2016), St. Kitts & Nevis (2016), St. Vincent & the Grenadines (2016), Trinidad & Tobago (2010, 2012, 2014). Notably, countries with larger populations, such as Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad & Tobago, tend to be best represented in the AmericasBarometer data with more surveys across multiple years. In addition, I exclude Suriname and Belize, despite their regular association with the region. For Suriname, the Dutch colonial history gives it a different set of cultural circumstances than the rest of the countries analyzed. With regard to Belize, although most recently colonized by the British, its Spanish colonial history and unique Garifuna racial groups make comparison to the other states questionable with regard to the effects of race on democratic attitudes.

## **Independent Variable**

The *main independent variable* in this analysis is the self-identified *race* of respondents. There are a number of both major and minor racial groups in the Caribbean that impact both politics and public opinion. Due to the legacy of African enslavement, the most populous group in the region are Black and Afro-Caribbeans. Given this, Black Caribbeans make up the vast majority of people in the sample. After emancipation, the British pushed the movement of South Asian people to the region to replace the lost labor of the enslaved Black population. While Indian people settled across the region, South Asian people settled most heavily in British Guiana (Guyana) and Trinidad & Tobago. The rest of the racial breakdown in the sample is the smaller populations of Indigenous, mixed, and white people. Indigenous populations are prevalent in certain places in the region as well, most notably in Guyana.

For a breakdown of the sample by race in each of the countries, refer to Table [SM2](#). As

can be seen from this table, Guyana and Trinidad & Tobago stand out from the other states due to the multiple large racial groups. Given this, I also estimate models where Guyana and Trinidad & Tobago are separated from the rest of the countries, which I report in the later part of the analysis.

## Dependent Variable

The *outcome of interest* in this study is “democratic attitudes”. I operationalize this in two ways, both as specific support and diffuse support (Easton 1975). The first concept of specific support I evaluate with *satisfaction with democracy*. This indicator captures object-oriented support for democracy at a “low level of generalization”, gauging the “functioning of democracy” in a particular temporal and country context (Anderson and Guillory, 1997, p. 70). This satisfaction question asks how satisfied the respondent is with how democracy is working in a given country. On the other hand, for the diffuse element of system support, I use a question that asks about preference for democracy. For this question, interviewers ask respondents to what extent they agree or disagree that “democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government”, with respondents given a scale from 1 to 7 with the high end indicating a stronger agreement with the prompt. For both satisfaction and support for democracy, I estimate multilevel linear models, where I treat the dependent variable as continuous. Because of the limited nature of the satisfaction variable, I also estimate multilevel ordered logistic models as a robustness check for the satisfaction models, which can be found in the Appendix. Results for these ordered models are very similar to the model results presented in the main text.

## Other Variables

To account for factors that may confound the relationship between racial identity and democratic attitudes, I include controls that would be correlated with both the independent and dependent variables. To begin, while recognizing the limitations of binary gender classifica-



Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Black			Indo-Caribbean			Mixed			White			Indigenous		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Satisfaction	16139	0.48	0.24	3404	0.54	0.24	2553	0.46	0.24	138	0.59	0.21	771	0.51	0.23
Support	16831	0.68	0.29	3640	0.7	0.3	2758	0.69	0.29	145	0.71	0.28	829	0.71	0.28
Income	17752	0.38	0.28	4064	0.35	0.26	3013	0.41	0.28	154	0.58	0.33	934	0.3	0.23
Public goods satisfaction (scale)	7963	0.53	0.17	1077	0.55	0.17	895	0.49	0.17	79	0.63	0.14	205	0.52	0.16
Woman	17752	0.49	0.5	4064	0.49	0.5	3013	0.54	0.5	154	0.5	0.5	934	0.53	0.5
Age	17752	0.28	0.19	4064	0.27	0.18	3013	0.24	0.18	154	0.29	0.2	934	0.25	0.17
Education	17752	0.59	0.18	4064	0.48	0.2	3013	0.56	0.19	154	0.71	0.19	934	0.43	0.21
Skin color	14407	0.55	0.16	2698	0.41	0.14	2181	0.4	0.16	140	0.19	0.2	504	0.29	0.14

tions, I include a binary control for *sex*, as women tend to experience forms of discrimination compounding racial discrimination that then may influence attitudes towards democracy. I also include a control for *education* and *income* as Black folks in the region tend to have less education and income, and these two factors also correlate with democratic attitudes. *Income* is also included as a moderator to evaluate **Hypothesis 2a**. In addition, I include a variable for *age* in years, as older people of various racial groups may have different experiences with democracy than younger folks, especially considering the recency of independence.

To evaluate **Hypothesis 2b**, where satisfaction with public goods moderates the relationship between race and democratic attitudes, I create a variable using an additive scale composed of responses to four questions relating to satisfaction with roads and transportation, satisfaction with the education system, satisfaction with healthcare, and satisfaction with the police. This variable is also then rescaled to range between 0 and 1, with higher values meaning more satisfaction with public goods (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.60).

In Table 1, I report summary statistics of the variables in the analysis by racial group. As can be seen in this table, the mean level of satisfaction for Black respondents is 0.48, 0.06 lower than Indo-Caribbean respondents, and 0.11 lower than white respondents. On the other hand, support for democracy is quite similar across racial groups. Corresponding to the discussion of racial inequities, white people in the sample exhibit the highest levels of education (white = 0.71, Black = 0.59), income (white = 0.58, Black = 0.38), and public goods satisfaction (white = 0.63, Black = 0.53) as compared to the other racial groups.


## Results

I report the first set of main results analyzing the association between race and democratic attitudes in Figure 1. In this figure, the  $y$ -axis shows the given racial group, while the  $x$ -axis demonstrates the predicted level of the specific democratic attitude. The panel on the left shows the predicted values of democratic satisfaction, and the panel on the right, the level of democratic support. In this figure, the lines represent 84% confidence intervals, which when compared between the predicted means approximates a t-test at the 95% confidence level.

The central expectation of the first hypothesis is that Black folks in the Caribbean, due to the systematic forms of exclusion that Black people in the Caribbean have faced both before and after independence, will be both less satisfied with democracy and be less likely to support democracy. Concerning democratic satisfaction in the left panel, Black Caribbeans display the lowest level of satisfaction with democracy, holding all else equal. Furthermore, the value for Black Caribbeans is statistically distinct from every other racial group other than Mixed Caribbeans. The largest gap in satisfaction among racial groups is between Black Caribbeans and Indo-Caribbeans, with a difference of 0.108. Furthermore, as hypothesized, the difference between Black and white Caribbeans (0.066) is both substantively and statistically significant, providing evidence of the more critical object-specific evaluations of democracy among Black Caribbeans. Despite the variations in satisfaction, from the right panel of Figure 1, it is clear that there is little difference in democratic support across racial groups, with none of the racial groups statistically significant from the others at the 0.05 level.

As put forward in my **Hypothesis 2a**, as compared to other racial groups, Black Caribbeans with less income will be even more likely to hold critical democratic attitudes due to enhanced histories of discrimination against this group. To evaluate this hypothesis, I interact racial identification with my measure of income. I show predicted values from this interaction in Figure 2 for both satisfaction and democratic support. In order to plot

Figure 1: Predicted **Satisfaction with Democracy** (left) and **Support for Democracy** (right) by Race in ten Caribbean countries



Note: Bars represent predicted values of satisfaction with democracy and support for democracy by race. Satisfaction with democracy and support for democracy range from 0 to 1. Numbers in parentheses and error bars represent 84% confidence intervals. Data from Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)


results where common support exists in the data, I show values in this figure at the mean, as well as 1 standard deviation above and below the mean to represent high and low income respectively. The bars around predicted estimates signify 84% confidence intervals.

For ease of interpretation, the quantity of interest in Figure 2 is the difference between racial groups in the gap between high and low income. The formula to generate this estimand would be written as:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Racial Attitude Gap} = & (\text{Black High Income} - \text{Black Low Income}) - \\
 & ([\text{Race}] \text{ High Income} - [\text{Race}] \text{ Low Income})
 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$


Given this, a positive and statistically significant value generated from the difference in differences of predicted values would indicate that a gap exists in the effect of income across races, and specifically that this income effect is of a larger magnitude for Black Caribbeans.

Figure 2: Predicted **Satisfaction with Democracy** (left) and **Support for Democracy** (right) by race and income in ten Caribbean countries



Note: Bars represent predicted values of satisfaction with democracy and support for democracy by race. Satisfaction with democracy and support for democracy range from 0 to 1. Numbers in parentheses and error bars represent 84% confidence intervals. Data from Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)

Figure 3: Predicted **Satisfaction with Democracy** (left) and **Support for Democracy** (right) by race and satisfaction with public goods in ten Caribbean countries



Note: Bars represent predicted values of satisfaction with democracy and support for democracy by race. Satisfaction with democracy and support for democracy range from 0 to 1. Numbers in parentheses and error bars represent 84% confidence intervals. Data from Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)

Keeping this interpretation in mind, the predicted level of Black satisfaction with democracy slightly increases when there are higher levels of income, from 0.456 for Black Caribbeans with low income to 0.474 for Black Caribbeans with high income. However, this difference is not statistically distinct from 0 at the 0.05 level as the confidence bars overlap. Despite this, the gap between low and high-income Black Caribbeans is statistically distinct from the gap for Indo-Caribbeans, where low-income Indo-Caribbeans have a slightly higher level of satisfaction than high-income Indo-Caribbeans (0.575 as compared to 0.569, respectively). There is thus a statistically significant gap of 0.012 ( $p < 0.05$ ) in the difference between the low and high-income groups for Black and Indo-Caribbeans, with high income therefore comparatively more meaningful for Black Caribbeans in explaining democratic satisfaction. With regard to the rest of the racial satisfaction differences, as well as the differences in support gaps, there are no further statistically significant results. However, an important finding with regard to democratic support is that across the board with regard to race, those with high income tend to be consistently more likely to support democracy.

To examine the role satisfaction with public goods has on moderating the relationship between racial identity and democratic attitudes, I interact race with public goods satisfaction. I display the predicted values of each dependent variable from this set of models in Figure 3. In this figure, satisfaction with democracy is on the left plot, and support for democracy is on the right. Again, error bars represent the 84% confidence intervals. Furthermore, I will again discuss differences as specified for the racial attitude gaps outlined for income.

To begin, from the left panel in Figure 3, results show that those with stronger levels of public goods satisfaction tend to be more satisfied with democracy. This trend is quite similar for Black, Indigenous, Indo-Caribbean, and Mixed Caribbeans. Given this, white Caribbeans are the only racial group that shows statistically distinct satisfaction gaps from Black Caribbeans, with a Black democratic satisfaction gap of 0.175 and a white democratic satisfaction gap = 0.042). With regard to support for democracy, there is again a trend of higher public goods satisfaction associating with stronger democratic support for Black

Caribbeans. This effect is of comparatively larger magnitude and is statistically significant for Black Caribbeans as compared to Indo-Caribbeans (Black support gap = 0.048 vs. Indo-Caribbean support gap = 0.004).

## The Cases of Guyana and Trinidad & Tobago

After the emancipation of enslaved Black Caribbeans in 1833 and the termination of a liminal post-emancipation ‘apprenticeship’ in 1838, white planters required cheap labor in order to keep the colonial economies profitable (Abdel-Shehid 2020; Wilson 2012). In order to meet the shifting demands in the Caribbean colonies, the British Empire implemented a system of indentured labor that imported a large population of ‘East Indians’ from the Indian subcontinent. Currently, although the Indo-Caribbean population extends across the region, the Indo-Guyanese and Indo-Trinidadian populations are the most prolific, with 39.83% of the 2012 Guyanese population and 35.4% (2011 estimate) of the Trinidadian population of South Indian descent (Guyanese Bureau of Statistics 2019; Central Intelligence Agency 2023). On the other hand, the Black Guyanese make up 29.25% of the country and Black Trinidadians 34.2%. Given this, Guyana and Trinidad & Tobago are the only two states in the Anglophone Caribbean where Black Caribbeans do not form the clear majority of the population.

The difference in population dynamics warrants further examination with regard to race and democracy. For instance, speaking of Guyana, Thomas notes that “the fact is that both Blacks and East Indians have a deep resentment for each other.” (Thomas, 1992, p. 400). Furthermore, observers have noticed political situations in the two countries that can be “adversarial” at times. To underscore this, the major political parties in both Guyana and Trinidad & Tobago are primarily divided by racial lines in their support bases and candidate selections.

In order to evaluate possible differences among these states in the Caribbean, I estimate models where *Guyana* and *Trinidad & Tobago* are separated from the *Rest of the Caribbean*.

As such Table 2 shows the effects broken by Guyana, Trinidad & Tobago, and the Rest of the Caribbean. Models 1, 4, and 7 evaluate Hypothesis 1 concerning the base effects of race as partitioned by the area of interest. Models 2, 5, and 8 investigate the interaction of race with income, and Models 3, 6, and 9 evaluate the interaction between race and public goods satisfaction. In the models assessing base effects (Models 1, 4, and 7), a positive sign indicates that the racial group indicated has a more positive outlook towards democracy than Black Caribbeans. For the interactive models for income and public goods satisfaction, a positive sign indicates that a larger attitude gap exists across income/public goods satisfaction for the given racial group as compared to Black Caribbeans, and a negative sign means effect gaps are comparatively greater for Black Caribbeans.

From the models examining the foundational associations of race and democratic attitudes, we notice clear distinctions across the different areas of interest. To begin, the most substantial findings for democratic satisfaction seem to come from Guyana and Trinidad & Tobago. Holding all else equal, Black Guyanese exhibit lower levels of democratic satisfaction as compared to Indo-Guyanese (Difference = 0.145,  $p < 0.001$ ), Mixed people (Difference = 0.046,  $p < 0.001$ ), and Indigenous Guyanese (Difference = 0.097,  $p < 0.001$ ). With regard to Trinidad & Tobago, holding other variables constant, Black Trinidadians are less satisfied than Indo-Trinidadians (Difference = 0.034,  $p = 0.002$ ) and white Trinidadians (Difference = 0.173  $p < 0.001$ ). On the other hand, for the Rest of the Caribbean, Black Caribbeans' satisfaction is only statistically distinct from mixed Caribbeans, and in this case, Black Caribbeans are actually *more* satisfied (Difference = 0.446,  $p = 0.006$ ). These results show that the results for satisfaction with democracy in the main analysis seem to primarily be influenced by Guyana and Trinidad & Tobago, which makes sense given the larger populations of the respective racial groups in those two contexts.

The results for support for democracy generally corroborate those results from the grouped analysis in the main results section. For both Guyana and the Rest of the Caribbean, Indigenous Caribbeans tend to have higher levels of support for democracy than Black Caribbeans.



Indeed, the magnitude of this difference is even larger in the Rest of the Caribbean than in Guyana (0.108 as compared to 0.030 in Guyana). Again, holding all else equal, mixed Caribbeans in the Rest of the Caribbean tend to exhibit lower evaluations of democracy than Black Caribbeans (Difference = 0.617,  $p < 0.001$ ).

Now turning to the conditional hypotheses regarding income, there tend to be some conflicting findings with regard to satisfaction with democracy. For instance, while trends for Indo-Caribbeans tend to be aligned with the base hypothesis in Guyana and Trinidad & Tobago, we see opposing trends in these two countries. More specifically, holding all else equal, in Guyana the effect of income on satisfaction with democracy is 0.065 less for Indo-Guyanese as compared to Black Guyanese ( $p = 0.016$ ). On the other hand, in Trinidad & Tobago the effect of income seems to be larger for the Indo-Trinidadians than Black Trinidadians, with a magnitude of 0.163 ( $p < 0.001$ ). For support for democracy, the only statistically significant findings are found in Guyana, where for every racial group other than *white*, the effect of income on support for democracy is comparatively less than for Black Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese = -0.127, Mixed = -0.112, Indigenous = -0.152). In addition, these differences are of a considerable magnitude with the dependent variable only ranging between 0 and 1.

Finally, for the results concerning the moderating impact of public goods satisfaction, we notice generally stronger effects on satisfaction with democracy. To begin, in the Guyanese case, the effect of satisfaction with public goods on democratic satisfaction is less impactful for Indo-Guyanese (Difference = 0.168,  $p < 0.001$ ) and Indigenous Guyanese (Difference = 0.250,  $p = 0.049$ ) as compared to Black Guyanese. Furthermore, in the Rest of the Caribbean, the effect of goods satisfaction for Black Caribbeans is considerably larger than for white Caribbeans (Difference = 0.394,  $p = 0.038$ ). On other hand, the moderating effects of public goods satisfaction seem far weaker on democratic support, with only mixed Trinidadians showing a significant difference from Black Trinidadians, with goods satisfaction mattering more to them for democratic support (Difference = 0.247,  $p = 0.014$ ).

Upon breaking down by Guyana, Trinidad & Tobago, and the Rest of the Caribbean, the results present some interesting takeaways. First, the effects comparing Black Caribbeans to Indo-Caribbeans, both in the base and interactive models, appear to be most driven by Guyana and Trinidad, which makes sense given the structure of racial politics in those two countries. Effects concerning Indigenous populations also seem to be guided by the Guyanese case, where there is the largest indigenous population in the Anglophone Caribbean. On the other hand, clear gaps do exist in the effects of public goods provision between white Caribbeans and Black Caribbeans in the *Rest of the Caribbean* context.

While the racial dynamics between Black and Indo-Caribbeans in Guyana and Trinidad & Tobago are no doubt important, another consideration is that in the Rest of the Caribbean sample, there are relatively fewer minorities as compared to Guyana and Trinidad. For instance, in the Rest of the Caribbean sample, there are 118 white respondents, 119 Indo-Caribbean respondents, and only 2 mixed respondents, as compared to 13,440 Black respondents. Despite the few minorities sampled, these racial minorities nevertheless play an important part in these countries, often holding critical positions of economic power ([Kelly 2023](#)). Given this, when examining racial differences outside of Guyana and Trinidad in this region, oversampling of white and Indo-Caribbeans could be necessary, as well as pairing quantitative results with qualitative investigations.

## Discussion and Conclusion

Returning to the piece by [Jefferson \(2023\)](#), can democracy really succeed when there is intense discrimination baked into a society ([Jefferson 2023](#))? This question resonates in the Anglophone Caribbean, just as it does in the United States. The constructions of race in the Caribbean are not dissimilar from those in the United States. Instead, the intellectual and democratic traditions of Black life have been heavily intertwined between the United States and English-speaking Caribbean, with a strong give-and-take impact of Black culture, life,

Table 2: Effects in Guyana, Trinidad & Tobago, and the Rest of the Caribbean. **Bold and highlighted** coefficients indicate statistically significant main effects.

	Guyana	Guyana	Guyana	Trinidad & Tobago	Trinidad & Tobago	Trinidad & Tobago	Rest of Caribbean	Rest of Caribbean	Rest of Caribbean
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
<b>Satisfaction</b>									
Indo-Caribbean	<b>0.145*</b> (0.007)	0.167* (0.011)	0.124* (0.040)	<b>0.034*</b> (0.011)	-0.034 (0.019)	-0.010 (0.049)	-0.012 (0.022)	0.002 (0.039)	0.274 (0.164)
Mixed	<b>0.046*</b> (0.008)	0.052* (0.013)	0.077 (0.040)	0.017 (0.011)	0.017 (0.020)	-0.054 (0.042)	<b>-0.446*</b> (0.163)	-0.440 (0.231)	
White	-0.016 (0.097)	0.024 (0.207)	-0.493 (0.990)	<b>0.173*</b> (0.045)	0.123 (0.125)	0.229 (0.329)	0.028 (0.023)	-0.009 (0.045)	0.257* (0.124)
Indigenous	<b>0.097*</b> (0.010)	0.109* (0.017)	0.175* (0.068)	-0.126 (0.091)	-0.232 (0.209)	0.214 (1.724)	-0.006 (0.032)	0.022 (0.058)	0.085 (0.101)
Public goods satisfaction			0.615* (0.053)			0.447* (0.050)			0.524* (0.017)
Income	-0.014 (0.014)	0.016 (0.022)	0.010 (0.018)	0.029 (0.018)	-0.007 (0.023)	-0.004 (0.024)	0.039* (0.008)	0.039* (0.008)	0.021* (0.010)
Indo-Caribbean × Income		<b>-0.065*</b> (0.027)			<b>0.163*</b> (0.038)			-0.036 (0.083)	
Mixed × Income		-0.019 (0.029)			0.002 (0.037)			-0.092 (2.610)	
White × Income		-0.071 (0.268)			0.086 (0.162)			0.070 (0.074)	
Indigenous × Income		-0.035 (0.046)			0.208 (0.352)			-0.057 (0.099)	
Indo-Caribbean × Public goods satisfaction			<b>-0.168*</b> (0.072)			0.123 (0.093)			-0.632 (0.327)
Mixed × Public goods satisfaction			-0.112 (0.077)			0.125 (0.084)			
White × Public goods satisfaction			0.596 (1.607)			-0.083 (0.558)			<b>-0.394*</b> (0.189)
Indigenous × Public goods satisfaction			<b>-0.250*</b> (0.127)			-0.712 (3.258)			-0.167 (0.179)
Constant	0.470* (0.024)	0.460* (0.025)	0.214* (0.066)	0.388* (0.017)	0.405* (0.018)	0.190* (0.033)	0.464* (0.019)	0.464* (0.019)	0.218* (0.022)
Number of respondents	7315	7315	1963	3004	3004	1348	12686	12686	6483
Number of surveys	6	6	2	3	3	1	14	14	8
var(survey-level constants)	0.003	0.003	0.006	0.000	0.000		0.004	0.002	
sd(survey-level constants)	0.051	0.05	0.078	0.005	0.000		0.059	0.059	0.044
AIC	-279.664	-261.563	-317.354	40.666	39.131	-222.786	-1093.33	-1081.196	-1774.873
<b>Support</b>									
Indo-Caribbean	0.006 (0.008)	0.051* (0.014)	0.022 (0.057)	0.013 (0.012)	-0.019 (0.022)	-0.111 (0.058)	-0.0004 (0.027)	-0.007 (0.046)	0.386 (0.226)
Mixed	0.001 (0.009)	0.042* (0.016)	-0.048 (0.058)	-0.017 (0.012)	-0.011 (0.022)	-0.159* (0.050)	<b>-0.617*</b> (0.200)	-0.636* (0.283)	
White	-0.198 (0.132)	-0.025 (0.262)	0.224 (1.427)	0.010 (0.052)	0.009 (0.144)	0.122 (0.387)	0.011 (0.027)	-0.034 (0.053)	-0.006 (0.164)
Indigenous	<b>0.030*</b> (0.013)	0.081* (0.021)	0.187 (0.101)	-0.062 (0.114)	0.020 (0.289)	-0.066 (0.185)	<b>0.108*</b> (0.039)	0.089 (0.069)	-0.086 (0.133)
Public goods satisfaction			0.091 (0.077)			0.057 (0.059)			0.169* (0.023)
Income	0.150* (0.017)	0.234* (0.026)	0.147* (0.026)	0.179* (0.023)	0.166* (0.029)	0.229* (0.029)	0.104* (0.010)	0.103* (0.010)	0.117* (0.013)
Indo-Caribbean × Income		<b>-0.127*</b> (0.033)			0.075 (0.043)			0.019 (0.099)	
Mixed × Income		<b>-0.112*</b> (0.035)			-0.012 (0.041)			0.300 (3.203)	
White × Income		-0.310 (0.362)			0.006 (0.185)			0.084 (0.085)	
Indigenous × Income		<b>-0.152*</b> (0.055)			-0.137 (0.456)			0.038 (0.116)	
Indo-Caribbean × Public goods satisfaction			-0.151 (0.105)			0.182 (0.109)			-0.724 (0.430)
Mixed × Public goods satisfaction			0.008 (0.112)			<b>0.247*</b> (0.100)			
White × Public goods satisfaction			-0.529 (2.316)			-0.414 (0.657)			0.037 (0.251)
Indigenous × Public goods satisfaction			-0.316 (0.189)						0.375 (0.235)
Constant	0.546* (0.028)	0.516* (0.029)	0.496* (0.061)	0.512* (0.038)	0.519* (0.040)	0.483* (0.039)	0.524* (0.020)	0.524* (0.020)	0.396* (0.024)
Number of respondents	7744	7744	1929	3339	3339	1333	13120	13120	6484
Number of surveys	6	6	2	3	3	1	14	14	8
var(survey-level constants)	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.003		0.003	0.003	0.001
sd(survey-level constants)	0.057	0.058	0.046	0.058	0.058		0.059	0.059	0.034
AIC	3149.832	3152.461	1087.492	997.01	1011.276	213.576	4232.173	4243.229	1937.473

Note:

and thought between the two regions (Rodney 2019).

In the recent work of Singh and Mayne (2023), the authors review major strands of the literature examining satisfaction with democracy. Significant areas of this literature on satisfaction with democracy look at electoral winning and losing, ideological and policy representation, economic performance, electoral systems, and more (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Singh and Mayne 2023). At the end of this piece, the authors state directions for future research on this concept and remark that research on democratic satisfaction “remains Europe-centric” and urge “this literature break free of its traditional geographic boundaries” (Singh and Mayne, 2023, p. 23).

In this piece, I have aimed to expand not only geographically but also thematically in the study of democratic attitudes. With regard to the point on geographic regions, the Caribbean, and especially the English-speaking Caribbean, is often excluded or subsumed in larger Latin American political research. This leads to a large deficit considering the recent history of independence and the relatively strong trajectory of democracy in the Anglophone Caribbean.

With regard to thematic development, I have also made theoretical and empirical advancements by examining race, especially related to Black political life and its relationship to democratic attitudes. This is an area that has been richly theorized by scholars of Black politics, both in the Caribbean and the United States, but not fully evaluated either in the United States or in other post-colonial states with large Black populations.

Furthermore, I echo statements that emphasize an increased focus on qualitative interpretation and mechanisms of democratic support and satisfaction, as put forth by Singh and Mayne (2023) and others. This observation is even more critical when evaluating relationships with race, as it cannot be causally assigned, and precise measures of compounding discrimination are difficult to generate. As voiced by Bowleg and Bauer (2016), frequently employed methods of causal-oriented, quantitative research “random sampling, longitudinal data, randomization—are often the same methods that do not work well (or at all) for

research with oppressed and marginalized communities, and render these groups and their experiences empirically invisible.” This makes the recent rise in quantitative studies evaluating Black people difficult and at times, inappropriate. Given this, the methods employed here are but one approach to evaluating the experiences with democracy for Black Caribbeans.

Due to the overlapping nature of colorism, classism, gender-based discrimination, and racism, examining causal mechanisms becomes fraught. Nonetheless, there needs to be updated quantitative and qualitative examinations of racial and class dynamics and their relationships with democracy. With regard to quantitative approaches, this would necessitate larger samples of minority populations (aka especially white Caribbeans in this case) in smaller states, which while costly, would be incredibly useful in parsing the effects between racial groups. Qualitative approaches could focus on interviews with individuals in these states and their experiences with multiple forms of discrimination, as well as “grounding” current political science knowledge with these valuable perspectives.

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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

**From Plantation Sugar to a Bittersweet Democracy:  
Black Democratic Attitudes in the English-Speaking  
Caribbean**

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# 1 Question wording

- **Satisfaction with democracy:** Satisfaction question: In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in [country]?
  - Coded to be 1-4, more satisfied high, rescaled to be 0-1
- **Support for democracy:** Support question (1-7) Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?
  - Response ranges from 1 to 7 (high). Rescaled to range between 0 and 1.
- **Income:** Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children?
  - Ranges depend on country income levels. From no income to high income. Rescaled to range between 0 and 1.
- **Age:** How old are you?
  - Responses in years with older higher
  - Rescaled to range between 0 and 1 with 1
- **Sex (Recoded to gender):**[Record but do not ask]:
  - Male or Female
  - Recoded to Man or Woman
- **Education:** How many years of schooling have you completed?
  - responses in years of schooling. Rescaled to range between 0 and 1.
- **Police satisfaction:** In general, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the performance of the police in your neighbourhood?
  - Coded to be 1-4, more satisfied high, rescaled to be 0-1
- **Roads satisfaction:** . And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?
  - Coded to be 1-4, more satisfied high, rescaled to be 0-1
- **School satisfaction:** And the quality of public schools? Are you...
  - Coded to be 1-4, more satisfied high, rescaled to be 0-1

- **Health satisfaction** And the quality of public medical and health services? Are you. . .
  - Coded to be 1-4, more satisfied high, rescaled to be 0-1

## 2 Descriptive statistics

Table SM1: Summary Statistics

Race	Black			Indo-Caribbean			Mixed			White			Indigenous		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Satisfaction	16139	0.48	0.24	3404	0.54	0.24	2553	0.46	0.24	138	0.59	0.21	771	0.51	0.23
Support	16831	0.68	0.29	3640	0.7	0.3	2758	0.69	0.29	145	0.71	0.28	829	0.71	0.28
Woman	17752	0.49	0.5	4064	0.49	0.5	3013	0.54	0.5	154	0.5	0.5	934	0.53	0.5
Age	17752	0.28	0.19	4064	0.27	0.18	3013	0.24	0.18	154	0.29	0.2	934	0.25	0.17
Education	17752	0.59	0.18	4064	0.48	0.2	3013	0.56	0.19	154	0.71	0.19	934	0.43	0.21
Income	17752	0.38	0.28	4064	0.35	0.26	3013	0.41	0.28	154	0.58	0.33	934	0.3	0.23
Skin color	14407	0.55	0.16	2698	0.41	0.14	2181	0.4	0.16	140	0.19	0.2	504	0.29	0.14
Roads satisfaction	11998	0.53	0.27	1448	0.48	0.27	1252	0.54	0.27	130	0.4	0.21	233	0.56	0.26
Schools satisfaction	11435	0.43	0.22	1383	0.41	0.22	1212	0.48	0.24	101	0.38	0.18	255	0.44	0.21
Healthcare satisfaction	11733	0.53	0.27	1432	0.51	0.28	1236	0.56	0.27	112	0.43	0.26	258	0.49	0.25
Police satisfaction	8573	0.43	0.24	1176	0.46	0.25	1021	0.51	0.26	112	0.31	0.17	235	0.47	0.25
Public goods satisfaction (scale)	7963	0.53	0.17	1077	0.55	0.17	895	0.49	0.17	79	0.63	0.14	205	0.52	0.16
Satisfaction (factor)	16139			3404			2553			138			771		
... 1	1584	10%		251	7%		281	11%		3	2%		50	6%	
... 2	6505	40%		1082	32%		1122	44%		37	27%		295	38%	
... 3	7358	46%		1830	54%		1049	41%		85	62%		396	51%	
... 4	692	4%		241	7%		101	4%		13	9%		30	4%	
Support (factor)	16831			3640			2758			145			829		
... 1	965	6%		225	6%		151	5%		7	5%		41	5%	
... 2	591	4%		122	3%		97	4%		2	1%		17	2%	
... 3	1389	8%		272	7%		231	8%		16	11%		58	7%	
... 4	2881	17%		560	15%		434	16%		14	10%		128	15%	
... 5	3150	19%		641	18%		513	19%		24	17%		169	20%	
... 6	2812	17%		642	18%		467	17%		43	30%		160	19%	
... 7	5043	30%		1178	32%		865	31%		39	27%		256	31%	

## 2.1 Racial breakdown

Table SM2: Racial groups by country in AmericasBarometer sample 2006-2021

Variable	N	Percent	Variable	N	Percent
Country: Bahamas			Country: Jamaica		
Race	3010		Race	9086	
... Black	2910	97%	... Black	8904	98%
... Indo-Caribbean	0	0%	... Indo-Caribbean	146	2%
... Mixed	0	0%	... Mixed	2	0%
... White	89	3%	... White	34	0%
... Indigenous	11	0%	... Indigenous	0	0%
Country: Barbados			Country: Saint Lucia		
Race	3461		Race	898	
... Black	3442	99%	... Black	883	98%
... Indo-Caribbean	0	0%	... Indo-Caribbean	0	0%
... Mixed	0	0%	... Mixed	0	0%
... White	19	1%	... White	1	0%
... Indigenous	0	0%	... Indigenous	14	2%
Country: Dominica			Country: St. Kitts and Nevis		
Race	892		Race	920	
... Black	867	97%	... Black	883	96%
... Indo-Caribbean	0	0%	... Indo-Caribbean	0	0%
... Mixed	0	0%	... Mixed	0	0%
... White	0	0%	... White	23	2%
... Indigenous	25	3%	... Indigenous	14	2%
Country: Grenada			Country: St. Vincent and Grenadines		
Race	812		Race	795	
... Black	788	97%	... Black	785	99%
... Indo-Caribbean	0	0%	... Indo-Caribbean	0	0%
... Mixed	0	0%	... Mixed	0	0%
... White	16	2%	... White	3	0%
... Indigenous	8	1%	... Indigenous	7	1%
Country: Guyana			Country: Trinidad and Tobago		
Race	9857		Race	3617	
... Black	3017	31%	... Black	1730	48%
... Indo-Caribbean	3424	35%	... Indo-Caribbean	885	24%
... Mixed	2478	25%	... Mixed	962	27%
... White	9	0%	... White	30	1%
... Indigenous	929	9%	... Indigenous	10	0%

## 2.2 Survey descriptive breakdown

Table SM3: Country year Summary Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Pctil. 25	Pctil. 75	Max	Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Pctil. 25	Pctil. 75	Max	Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Pctil. 25	Pctil. 75	Max	Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Pctil. 25	Pctil. 75	Max
<b>Bahamas 2014</b>								<b>Grenada 2016</b>								<b>Guyana 2010</b>								<b>Guyana 2016</b>							
Year	1815	2014	0	2014	2014	2014	2014	Year	594	2016	0	2016	2016	2016	2016	Year	1276	2010	0	2010	2010	2010	Year	1178	2016	0	2016	2016	2016	2016	
Satisfaction	1761	0.61	0.19	0	0.67	0.67	1	Satisfaction	569	0.56	0.22	0	0.33	0.67	1	Satisfaction	1152	0.45	0.27	0	0.33	0.67	1	Satisfaction	1089	0.56	0.22	0	0.33	0.67	1
Support	1772	0.67	0.27	0	0.5	0.83	1	Support	573	0.66	0.27	0	0.5	1	1	Support	1164	0.72	0.31	0	0.5	1	1	Support	1089	0.62	0.33	0	0.5	1	1
Race	1710							Race	518							Race	1263						Race	1162							
... Black	1652	97%						... Black	504	97%						... Black	441	35%					... Black	354	30%						
... Indo-Caribbean	0	0%						... Indo-Caribbean	0	0%						... Indo-Caribbean	424	34%					... Indo-Caribbean	378	33%						
... Mixed	0	0%						... Mixed	0	0%						... Mixed	293	23%					... Mixed	344	30%						
... White	51	3%						... White	9	2%						... White	0	0%					... White	5	0%						
... Indigenious	7	0%						... Indigenious	5	1%						... Indigenious	132	10%					... Indigenious	81	7%						
Woman	1815	0.5	0.5	0	0	1	1	Woman	594	0.51	0.5	0	0	1	1	Woman	1276	0.5	0.5	0	0	1	1	Woman	1178	0.49	0.5	0	0	1	1
Age	1815	0.27	0.17	0	0.12	0.37	0.94	Age	594	0.27	0.19	0	0.12	0.37	0.89	Age	1276	0.24	0.17	0	0.11	0.36	0.99	Age	1178	0.29	0.2	0.012	0.11	0.43	0.88
Education	1815	0.67	0.12	0	0.67	0.67	1	Education	594	0.59	0.19	0	0.39	0.67	1	Education	1276	0.51	0.18	0	0.33	0.61	1	Education	1178	0.55	0.18	0	0.44	0.61	1
Income	1815	0.4	0.21	0	0.25	0.5	1	Income	594	0.31	0.28	0	0.062	0.5	1	Income	1276	0.23	0.12	0	0.19	0.31	0.62	Income	1178	0.49	0.3	0	0.19	0.75	1
Color_resp	1810	0.5	0.2	0	0.36	0.64	0.91	Color_resp	594	0.5	0.18	0	0.36	0.64	0.91	Color_resp	1275	0.46	0.17	0	0.36	0.55	0.93	Color_resp	1157	0.41	0.16	0	0.27	0.55	0.91
roads_satis	1801	0.42	0.23	0	0.33	0.33	1	roads_satis	594	0.48	0.27	0	0.33	0.67	1	roads_satis	1275	0.46	0.17	0	0.36	0.55	0.93	roads_satis	1141	0.46	0.25	0	0.33	0.67	1
school_satis	1718	0.37	0.21	0	0.33	0.33	1	school_satis	544	0.4	0.18	0	0.33	0.33	1	school_satis	0	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	school_satis	1121	0.42	0.22	0	0.33	0.67	1
health_satis	1777	0.4	0.25	0	0.33	0.67	1	health_satis	572	0.58	0.29	0	0.33	0.67	1	health_satis	0	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	health_satis	1150	0.49	0.25	0	0.33	0.67	1
police_satis	1782	0.33	0.2	0	0.33	0.33	1	police_satis	577	0.41	0.21	0	0.33	0.33	1	police_satis	0	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	police_satis	1089	0.46	0.25	0	0.33	0.67	1
Public goods satisfaction	1663	0.62	0.15	0	0.58	0.67	1	Public goods satisfaction	523	0.53	0.16	0	0.42	0.67	1	Public goods satisfaction	0	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Public goods satisfaction	1013	0.54	0.16	0	0.42	0.67	1
Satisfaction_factor	1761							Satisfaction_factor	569							Satisfaction_factor	1152						Satisfaction_factor	1089							
... 1	58	3%						... 1	28	5%						... 1	169	15%					... 1	52	5%						
... 2	293	17%						... 2	158	28%						... 2	507	43%					... 2	127	10%						
... 3	1303	74%						... 3	347	61%						... 3	413	36%					... 3	635	58%						
... 4	107	6%						... 4	36	6%						... 4	73	6%					... 4	75	7%						
Support_factor	1772							Support_factor	573							Support_factor	1164						Support_factor	1089							
... 1	50	3%						... 1	19	3%						... 1	86	7%					... 1	116	11%						
... 2	70	4%						... 2	11	2%						... 2	35	3%					... 2	52	5%						
... 3	223	13%						... 3	53	9%						... 3	85	7%					... 3	102	9%						
... 4	278	16%						... 4	170	30%						... 4	139	12%					... 4	194	18%						
... 5	381	22%						... 5	108	19%						... 5	154	13%					... 5	189	17%						
... 6	394	22%						... 6	51	9%						... 6	186	16%					... 6	129	12%						
... 7	376	21%						... 7	161	28%						... 7	479	41%					... 7	307	28%						

Table SM3: Country year Summary Statistics (continued)

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Pctl. 25	Pctl. 75	Max	Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Pctl. 25	Pctl. 75	Max	Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Pctl. 25	Pctl. 75	Max	Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Pctl. 25	Pctl. 75	Max																								
<b>Jamaica 2010</b>																																																							
Year	1211	2010		0	2010	2010	2010	<b>Jamaica 2017</b>																																															
Satisfaction	1163	0.46	0.25	0	0.33	0.67	1	Year	1061	2017		0	2017	2017	2017	<b>St. Kitts and Nevis 2016</b>																																							
Support	1168	0.69	0.3	0	0.5	1	1	Satisfaction	995	0.42	0.26	0	0.33	0.67	1	Year	692	2016		0	2016	2016	2016	<b>Trinidad &amp; Tobago 2012</b>																															
Race	1102							Support	993	0.62	0.3	0	0.5	0.83	1	Satisfaction	653	0.71	0.28	0	0.5	1	1	Year	862	2012		0	2012	2012	2012																								
... Black	1068	97%						Race	942						Race	644						Satisfaction	805	0.47	0.24	0	0.33	0.67	1																										
... Indo-Caribbean	31	3%						... Black	930	99%					... Black	616	96%					Support	777	0.7	0.29	0	0.5	1	1																										
... Mixed	2	0%						... Indo-Caribbean	10	1%					... Indo-Caribbean	0	0%					Race	856																																
... White	1	0%						... Mixed	0	0%					... Mixed	226	26%					... Black	397	46%																															
... Indigenous	0	0%						... White	2	0%					... White	225	26%					... Indo-Caribbean	229	26%																															
Woman	1211	0.5	0.5	0	0	1	1	... Indigenous	0	0%					... Indigenous	18	3%					... Mixed	225	26%																															
Age	1211	0.31	0.19	0	0.15	0.42	0.84	Woman	1061	0.5	0.5	0	0	1	1	Age	692	0.5	0.5	0	0	1	1	Age	862	0.28	0.19	0	0.11	0.41	0.95																								
Education	1211	0.56	0.17	0	0.5	0.61	0.94	Age	1061	0.26	0.2	0	0.099	0.38	0.9	Age	692	0.28	0.17	0	0.14	0.4	0.89	Education	862	0.57	0.19	0	0.5	0.67	0.83																								
Income	1211	0.25	0.15	0	0.12	0.38	0.62	Education	1061	0.58	0.15	0	0.5	0.61	0.94	Education	692	0.69	0.15	0	0.67	0.78	1	Income	862	0.52	0.23	0	0.38	0.69	1																								
Color_resp	1211	0.57	0.17	0	0.45	0.73	0.91	Income	1061	0.52	0.31	0	0.25	0.81	1	Income	692	0.46	0.17	0	0.36	0.55	0.91	Color_resp	862	0.48	0.17	0.091	0.36	0.64	0.91																								
roads_sat	0	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Color_resp	1061	0.5	0.18	0	0.36	0.64	0.91	Color_resp	692	0.46	0.17	0	0.36	0.55	0.91	roads_sat	862	0.6	0.28	0	0.33	0.67	1																								
schools_sat	0	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	roads_sat	1057	0.63	0.29	0	0.33	1	1	roads_sat	690	0.38	0.22	0	0.33	0.33	1	schools_sat	767	0.51	0.25	0	0.33	0.67	1																								
health_sat	0	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	schools_sat	1033	0.44	0.26	0	0.33	0.67	1	schools_sat	629	0.38	0.19	0	0.33	0.33	1	health_sat	840	0.67	0.27	0	0.33	1	1																								
police_sat	0	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	health_sat	1046	0.55	0.3	0	0.33	0.67	1	health_sat	677	0.47	0.24	0	0.33	0.67	1	police_sat	0	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf																								
Public goods satisfaction	0	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	police_sat	0	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	police_sat	655	0.47	0.23	0	0.33	0.67	1	Public goods satisfaction	0	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf																									
Satisfaction_factor	1163							Public goods satisfaction	0	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Inf	Public goods satisfaction	591	0.57	0.14	0	0.5	0.67	1	Satisfaction_factor	405																															
... 1	132	11%						Satisfaction_factor	995						Satisfaction_factor	635						... 1	40	10%																															
... 2	305	47%						... 1	165	17%					... 1	46	7%					... 2	109	42%																															
... 3	477	41%						... 2	489	47%					... 2	215	34%					... 3	183	45%																															
... 4	49	4%						... 3	313	31%					... 3	341	54%					... 4	13	3%																															
Support_factor	1168							... 4	48	5%					... 4	33	5%					Support_factor	777																																
... 1	79	7%						Support_factor	993						Support_factor	653						... 1	38	5%																															
... 2	48	4%						... 1	91	9%					... 1	27	4%					... 2	29	4%																															
... 3	86	7%						... 2	40	4%					... 2	14	2%					... 3	55	7%																															
... 4	146	12%						... 3	74	7%					... 3	51	8%					... 4	123	16%																															
... 5	239	20%						... 4	226	23%					... 4	137	21%					... 5	138	18%																															
... 6	232	20%						... 5	214	22%					... 5	105	16%					... 6	148	19%																															
... 7	347	30%						... 6	139	14%					... 6	78	12%					... 7	246	32%																															
... 7	347	30%						... 7	209	21%					... 7	241	37%					... 7	246	32%																															



### 3 Table results

Table SM4: Main results corresponding to Figures 1-3

	Satisfaction			Support		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Indo-Caribbean	0.108* (0.006)	0.124* (0.008)	0.069* (0.025)	0.007 (0.006)	0.001 (0.010)	0.029 (0.033)
Mixed	0.031* (0.006)	0.044* (0.010)	0.011 (0.024)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.057 (0.032)
White	0.067* (0.020)	0.005 (0.042)	0.276* (0.115)	0.004 (0.024)	-0.021 (0.049)	-0.028 (0.153)
Indigenous	0.077* (0.009)	0.100* (0.015)	0.127* (0.053)	0.032* (0.011)	0.036* (0.018)	0.121 (0.072)
Public goods satisfaction			0.530* (0.016)			0.146* (0.021)
Woman	0.011* (0.003)	0.011* (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.004 (0.006)
Income	0.025* (0.007)	0.033* (0.007)	0.017* (0.008)	0.124* (0.008)	0.123* (0.009)	0.141* (0.011)
Education	-0.029* (0.009)	-0.028* (0.009)	-0.010 (0.014)	0.111* (0.011)	0.111* (0.011)	0.100* (0.018)
Age	0.007 (0.009)	0.006 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.012)	0.159* (0.010)	0.159* (0.010)	0.160* (0.016)
Indo-Caribbean × Income		-0.044* (0.018)			0.015 (0.021)	
Mixed × Income		-0.033 (0.019)			-0.0001 (0.022)	
White × Income		0.104 (0.064)			0.043 (0.074)	
Indigenous × Income		-0.070 (0.038)			-0.014 (0.044)	
Indo-Caribbean × Public goods satisfaction			-0.053 (0.043)			-0.135* (0.058)
Mixed × Public goods satisfaction			0.012 (0.045)			0.039 (0.061)
White × Public goods satisfaction			-0.404* (0.178)			0.038 (0.236)
Indigenous × Public goods satisfaction			-0.170 (0.097)			-0.127 (0.132)
Constant	0.464* (0.014)	0.461* (0.015)	0.214* (0.019)	0.529* (0.014)	0.530* (0.015)	0.427* (0.020)
Number of respondents	23005	23005	9794	24203	24203	9746
Number of surveys	23	23	11	23	23	11
var(survey-level constants)	0.004	0.004	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.001
sd(survey-level constants)	0.061	0.061	0.047	0.057	0.057	0.032
AIC	-1214.31	-1198.817	-2333.475	8322.576	8349.082	3271.879

Note:

\*p<0.05

Table SM5: Satisfaction results using multilevel ordered logistic regression

	Satisfaction		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Indo-Caribbean	0.91* (0.05)	1.03* (0.07)	0.56* (0.24)
Mixed	0.25* (0.05)	0.38* (0.08)	0.25 (0.22)
White	0.52* (0.17)	-0.01 (0.34)	2.15 (1.12)
Indigenous	0.64* (0.08)	0.82* (0.12)	1.14* (0.51)
Woman	0.09* (0.03)	0.09* (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)
Income	0.23* (0.06)	0.29* (0.06)	0.18* (0.08)
Education	-0.22* (0.08)	-0.22* (0.08)	-0.12 (0.13)
Age	0.05 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.11)
Indo-Caribbean $\times$ Income		-0.33* (0.15)	
Mixed $\times$ Income		-0.32* (0.15)	
White $\times$ Income		0.90 (0.53)	
Indigenous $\times$ Income		-0.58 (0.31)	
Public goods satisfaciton			5.14* (0.16)
Indo-Caribbean $\times$ Public goods satisfaction			-0.43 (0.42)
Mixed $\times$ Public goods satisfaction			-0.26 (0.42)
White $\times$ Public goods satisfaction			-3.17 (1.74)
Indigenous $\times$ Public goods satisfaction			-1.64 (0.94)
1—2	-2.15* (0.12)	-2.13* (0.12)	0.01 (0.18)
2—3	0.16 (0.12)	0.19 (0.12)	2.57* (0.18)
3—4	3.37* (0.12)	3.40* (0.12)	6.25* (0.19)
Number of respondents	23005	23005	9794
Number of surveys	23	23	11
var(survey-level constants)	0.25	0.25	0.18
sd(survey-level constants)	0.25	0.25	0.18
AIC	48514.58	48509.07	18599.42
<i>Note:</i>			*p<0.05

Table SM6: Satisfaction with democracy results breaking down Guyana, Trinidad & Tobago, and Rest of the Caribbean

	Satisfaction								
	Guyana	Guyana	Guyana	Trinidad & Tobago	Trinidad & Tobago	Trinidad & Tobago	Rest of Caribbean	Rest of Caribbean	Rest of Caribbean
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Indo-Caribbean	0.145* (0.007)	0.167* (0.011)	0.124* (0.040)	0.034* (0.011)	-0.034 (0.019)	-0.010 (0.049)	-0.012 (0.022)	0.002 (0.039)	0.274 (0.164)
Mixed	0.046* (0.008)	0.052* (0.013)	0.077 (0.040)	0.017 (0.011)	0.017 (0.020)	-0.054 (0.042)	-0.446* (0.163)	-0.440 (0.231)	
White	-0.016 (0.097)	0.024 (0.207)	-0.493 (0.990)	0.173* (0.045)	0.123 (0.125)	0.229 (0.329)	0.028 (0.023)	-0.009 (0.045)	0.257* (0.124)
Indigenous	0.097* (0.010)	0.109* (0.017)	0.175* (0.068)	-0.126 (0.091)	-0.232 (0.209)	0.214 (1.724)	-0.006 (0.032)	0.022 (0.058)	0.085 (0.101)
Public goods satisfaction			0.615* (0.053)			0.447* (0.050)			0.524* (0.017)
Woman	0.014* (0.006)	0.014* (0.006)	0.016 (0.010)	0.006 (0.009)	0.008 (0.009)	0.0001 (0.012)	0.009* (0.004)	0.009* (0.004)	0.003 (0.005)
Income	-0.014 (0.014)	0.016 (0.022)	0.010 (0.018)	0.029 (0.018)	-0.007 (0.023)	-0.004 (0.024)	0.039* (0.008)	0.039* (0.008)	0.021* (0.010)
Education	-0.079* (0.016)	-0.079* (0.016)	-0.088* (0.032)	0.058* (0.022)	0.054* (0.022)	0.090* (0.033)	-0.012 (0.013)	-0.012 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.017)
Age	-0.090* (0.016)	-0.090* (0.016)	-0.115* (0.027)	0.048* (0.024)	0.049* (0.024)	0.036 (0.033)	0.052* (0.011)	0.052* (0.011)	0.024 (0.015)
Indo-Caribbean × Income		-0.065* (0.027)			0.163* (0.038)			-0.036 (0.083)	
Mixed × Income		-0.019 (0.029)			0.002 (0.037)			-0.092 (2.610)	
White × Income		-0.071 (0.268)			0.086 (0.162)			0.070 (0.074)	
Indigenous × Income		-0.035 (0.046)			0.208 (0.352)			-0.057 (0.099)	
Indo-Caribbean × Public goods satisfaction			-0.168* (0.072)			0.123 (0.093)			-0.632 (0.327)
Mixed × Public goods satisfaction			-0.112 (0.077)			0.125 (0.084)			
White × Public goods satisfaction			0.596 (1.607)			-0.083 (0.558)			-0.394* (0.189)
Indigenous × Public goods satisfaction			-0.250* (0.127)			-0.712 (3.258)			-0.167 (0.179)
Constant	0.470* (0.024)	0.460* (0.025)	0.214* (0.066)	0.388* (0.017)	0.405* (0.018)	0.190* (0.033)	0.464* (0.019)	0.464* (0.019)	0.218* (0.022)
Number of respondents	7315	7315	1963	3004	3004	1348	12686	12686	6483
Number of surveys	6	6	2	3	3	1	14	14	8
var(survey-level constants)	0.003	0.003	0.006	0	0	0.004	0.004	0.002	
sd(survey-level constants)	0.051	0.05	0.078	0.005	0	0	0.059	0.059	0.044
AIC	-279.664	-261.563	-317.354	40.666	39.131	-222.786	-1093.33	-1081.196	-1774.873

Note:

\*p<0.05

Table SM7: Support for democracy results breaking down Guyana, Trinidad & Tobago, and Rest of the Caribbean

	Support								
	Guyana	Guyana	Guyana	Trinidad & Tobago	Trinidad & Tobago	Trinidad & Tobago	Rest of Caribbean	Rest of Caribbean	Rest of Caribbean
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Indo-Caribbean	0.006 (0.008)	0.051* (0.014)	0.022 (0.057)	0.013 (0.012)	-0.019 (0.022)	-0.111 (0.058)	-0.0004 (0.027)	-0.007 (0.046)	0.386 (0.226)
Mixed	0.001 (0.009)	0.042* (0.016)	-0.048 (0.058)	-0.017 (0.012)	-0.011 (0.022)	-0.159* (0.050)	-0.617* (0.200)	-0.636* (0.283)	
White	-0.198 (0.132)	-0.025 (0.262)	0.224 (1.427)	0.010 (0.052)	0.009 (0.144)	0.122 (0.387)	0.011 (0.027)	-0.034 (0.053)	-0.006 (0.164)
Indigenous	0.030* (0.013)	0.081* (0.021)	0.187 (0.101)	-0.062 (0.114)	0.020 (0.289)	-0.066 (0.185)	0.108* (0.039)	0.089 (0.069)	-0.086 (0.133)
Public goods satisfaction			0.091 (0.077)			0.057 (0.059)			0.169* (0.023)
Woman	-0.013 (0.007)	-0.013 (0.007)	-0.019 (0.015)	0.015 (0.010)	0.015 (0.010)	0.003 (0.014)	0.003 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	0.012 (0.007)
Income	0.150* (0.017)	0.234* (0.026)	0.147* (0.026)	0.179* (0.023)	0.166* (0.029)	0.229* (0.029)	0.104* (0.010)	0.103* (0.010)	0.117* (0.013)
Education	0.133* (0.020)	0.134* (0.020)	0.077 (0.046)	0.086* (0.025)	0.085* (0.025)	0.027 (0.039)	0.105* (0.016)	0.105* (0.016)	0.126* (0.023)
Age	0.106* (0.019)	0.102* (0.019)	0.113* (0.039)	0.188* (0.027)	0.188* (0.027)	0.123* (0.039)	0.178* (0.014)	0.178* (0.014)	0.183* (0.020)
Indo-Caribbean × Income		-0.127* (0.033)			0.075 (0.043)			0.019 (0.099)	
Mixed × Income		-0.112* (0.035)			-0.012 (0.041)			0.300 (3.203)	
White × Income		-0.310 (0.362)			0.006 (0.185)			0.084 (0.085)	
Indigenous × Income		-0.152* (0.055)			-0.137 (0.456)			0.038 (0.116)	
Indo-Caribbean × Public goods satisfaction			-0.151 (0.105)			0.182 (0.109)			-0.724 (0.430)
Mixed × Public goods satisfaction			0.008 (0.112)			0.247* (0.100)			
White × Public goods satisfaction			-0.529 (2.316)			-0.414 (0.657)			0.037 (0.251)
Indigenous × Public goods satisfaction			-0.316 (0.189)						0.375 (0.235)
Constant	0.546* (0.028)	0.516* (0.029)	0.496* (0.061)	0.512* (0.038)	0.519* (0.040)	0.483* (0.039)	0.524* (0.020)	0.524* (0.020)	0.396* (0.024)
Number of respondents	7744	7744	1929	3339	3339	1333	13120	13120	6484
Number of surveys	6	6	2	3	3	1	14	14	8
var(survey-level constants)	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.003		0.003	0.003	0.001
sd(survey-level constants)	0.057	0.058	0.046	0.058	0.058		0.059	0.059	0.034
AIC	3149.832	3152.461	1087.492	997.01	1011.276	213.576	4232.173	4243.229	1937.473

Note:

\*p<0.05